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Abstract
The debate on privatisation is central to social policy, yet it tends to generate more heat
than light as definitions and operationalisations of ‘privatisation’ are often implicit, unclear and
conflicting. This paper aims to explore the extent of privatisation in the NHS over three periods
of government through the lens of three approaches of Mixed Economy of Welfare, Wheels
of Welfare and Publicness. All have two dimensions of provision and finance in common, but
Mixed Economy of Welfare and Publicness stress the third dimension, that of regulation, while
Wheels of Welfare stresses decision. All three approaches agree that some policies in the NHS
constitute privatisation, but there is some disagreement largely stemming from their differential
stress on regulation or decision. It is important to introduce a degree of transparency in the
debate which provides clear definitions and rationales. However, all approaches require further
development which focuses on the important but neglected point of how different types of
privatisation lead to different impacts on patients.
Introduction
One of the major concerns of social policy is the issue of ‘politics against markets’
(Esping-Andersen, 1985), in terms of public versus private or the state versus
market. This can be seen in terms of residual and institutional welfare states
(Titmuss, 1958), de-commodification (Esping-Andersen, 1990), the privatisation
of risk (Hacker, 2004; cf Esping-Andersen, 1999), the cash nexus and the
purchased versus the provided good or service (Marshall, 1963; Crosland, 1964).
However, there are different meanings of ‘public’ (Marquand, 2004; Newman
and Clarke, 2009) and crude dichotomies may be problematic (Maarse, 2006;
Newman and Clarke, 2009; Edmiston, 2011). The Commission on Private–Public
Partnerships (2001) rejects the blind alleys of the ‘privatisers’ – ‘private good,
public bad’ – and the ‘monopolists’– public good, private bad.
Commentators point to the global rise of markets in the context of the
World Trade Organisation’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
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aim of private providers bidding to run public services (Pollock, 2005: 64–65;
Lister, 2008: 307–309; Mohan, 2009: 88; Newman and Clarke, 2009: 76). As in
other public services, ‘privatisation’ appears to be part of an international trend in
recent years in health care (e.g., Maarse, 2006), with some commentators pointing
to the British National Health Service (NHS) as an international ‘leader’ (e.g.,
Pollock, 2005: 18). Recent governments’ vision of an increasingly diverse range of
providers of health care services have led to accusations of ‘privatising the NHS’
(e.g., Pollock, 2005; Lister, 2008, 2012, 2013; Leys and Player, 2011; Davis and Tallis,
2013; but see Ham, 2012; Klein, 2013).
This debate (or non-debate) tends to generate more heat than light as
definitions and operationalisations of ‘privatisation’ are often implicit, unclear
and conflicting, with unclear academic and stakeholder definitions resulting in a
‘Tower of Babel’ (Powell and Miller, 2013).
This paper aims to provide some clarity on the topic by exploring the extent
of privatisation in the NHS through three different frames or lenses: the Mixed
Economy of Welfare (MEW) (Powell, 2007, 2008), ‘Wheels of Welfare’ (WoW)
(Burchardt, 1997) and Publicness (e.g., Bozeman, 1987). It discusses perspectives
on privatisation in general before examining the three approaches in more detail.
It then explores application of the approaches to the NHS, before moving to a
broader discussion comparing the approaches.
Privatisation
Much of the literature makes empirical claims about privatisation on the basis of
absent at worst, or rather shaky at best, definitions, perhaps believing its meaning
to be clear. However, Starr (1988) points to the complexity of its definition,
with privatisation having varied and at times unclear meanings. According to
Drakeford (2000), privatisation is an overloaded term with limited analytical
power. Maarse (2006) argues that the study of privatisation in health care requires
a conceptual framework to unravel its complexity and multidimensionality. Klein
(2013: 123, 299) writes that the concept of ‘privatisation’ is more complex than
political stereotypes or rhetoric would suggest, and is a ‘malleable term’ (see also
Klein, 1988; Powell, 2008).
Some accounts tend to conflate privatisation with cognate terms such
as marketisation or commercialisation. However, Starr (1988) considers
privatisation as shifts from the public to the private sector, not shifts within sectors
such as the conversion of a state agency into an autonomous public authority
or state-owned enterprise, or the conversion of a private non-profit organisation
into a profit-making firm. He considers that both of these intrasectoral changes
might be described as commercialisation, but this is sometimes a preliminary
stage to privatisation. Within the NHS a number of commentators broadly
argue that the NHS was ‘marketised’ rather than ‘privatised’ (in the narrow
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sense of asset transfer as in other areas such as state housing and national
utilities) (e.g., Timmins, 2001; Marquand, 2004). However, others have pointed
to marketisation, commercialisation and corporatisation (provider autonomy)
as possible preludes or first steps to privatisation (e.g., Mohan, 2009; Gingrich,
2011: 60; Lister, 2013: 184, 200–201).
Different commentators tend to define privatisation in different ways. At
one end of the spectrum, there are narrow, minimalist or ‘one-dimensional’
definitions (see below) that focus on the transfer of assets. Dictionary definitions
tend to be narrow. Mathieson (2012) points out that ‘Collins’ defines privatise
as ‘to transfer (the production of goods and services) from the public sector
of an economy into private ownership and operation’, while the Oxford English
Dictionary defines it as a transfer ‘from public to private ownership and control’.
In terms of academic definitions, Crouch (2003: 15) argues that privatisation
occurs when ownership of a previous public resource is transferred to private
firms, while under contracting out ownership remains with the public sector.
In his view, Labour reforms in health involve partnerships and sub-contracting
rather than privatisation. Similarly, Dunleavy (1986: 13) defines ‘privatisation’
strictly as the permanent transferring of services or goods production activities,
previously carried out by public service bureaucracies, to private firms or to other
forms of non-public organisation, such as voluntary groups. He writes that
I see no analytic point whatsoever in fitting the label ‘privatision’ to a range of other changes –
such as cutting down the scope of public policy responsibilities, selling state-held equities in
corporations, selling off public capital assets to finance revenue spending, or encouraging new
private sector initiatives – which have no theoretical or empirical inter-connection with each
other or with contracting-out, but which are customarily grouped together for ideological
reasons. (p. 32, n)
Other commentators take a broader perspective. Savas (1989) defines
privatisation as ‘the act of reducing the role of government, or increasing the role
of the private sector, in an activity or in the ownership of assets’. Starr (1988) writes
that privatisation has come primarily to mean any shift of activities or functions
from the state to the private sector, with the spectrum of alternatives running
from total privatisation (as in government disengagement from some policy
domain) to partial privatisation (as in contracting-out or vouchers). According
to Le Grand and Robinson (1984), privatisation involves a reduction in state
activity in one of the areas of provision, subsidy and regulation. Drakeford (2008:
161) states that private welfare is understood in three main ways: ownership of
assets, provision of services and the allocation of responsibilities between the state
and the individual (see also Johnson, 1989; Drakeford, 2000). Maarse (2006) sets
out four types: privatisation of provision, finance, management and operations
and investment.
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Young (1986) presents a wide concept of privatisation, arguing that policies
contain one or more of the following elements: current balance (size, scope,
role); balance in the longer term by creating opportunities for the private sector
to grow (e.g., by changing regulations); private resources to solve government
problems (e.g., use of business practices); and increased market pressures to bear
on the use of assets staying inside the public sector (e.g., internal and external
competition). Using these four elements, Young argues that seven different forms
of privatisation are identifiable in Conservative policy since 1979 (although he
gives few NHS examples):
(a) selling off public assets
(b) relaxing state monopolies
(c) contracting
(d) private provision of services
(e) investment projects
(f) extending private sector practices into the public sector
(g) reduced subsidies and increased charges
Similarly, Savas (1989) sets out a taxonomy of privatisation strategies:
• divestiture or outright sale of public sector assets in which the state divests itself
of public assets to private owners;
• franchising or contracting out to private, for-profit or not-for-profit providers;
• self management, wherein providers are given autonomy to generate and spend
resources;
• market liberalisation or deregulation to actively promote growth of the private
health sector through various incentive mechanisms; and
• withdrawal from state provision, wherein the private sector grows rapidly as
a result of the failure on the part of the government to meet the healthcare
demands of the people.
None of these competing frameworks appears to command widespread
acceptance. Peedell (2011) argues that the government’s health reforms fulfil
‘commonly accepted’ criteria for privatisation as they will result in increasing
privatisation of the English NHS according to all of Savas’ (1989) five criteria.
However, there are no ‘commonly accepted’ criteria for privatisation. It can
equally be argued that according to ‘dictionary’ definitions, the government is
not privatising the NHS (Mathieson, 2012). According to Health Minister, Simon
Burns (2012), opposition to change is part of the NHS’s history, and there is ‘a
weary familiarity to the rhetoric’. He sets out accusations of ‘privatisation’ from
earlier years, such as 1988 and 1992, and states that if you look for ‘creeping
privatisation’ and ‘NHS’ in the Hansard search engine, you will find over twenty-
five years’ worth of parliamentary invective. Almost without exception, every
major change to the NHS has been caricatured as a relentless march towards the
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TABLE 1. Types of privatisation according to the MEW
State Market Voluntary Informal
Provision Provision Provision Provision
State Funding 1 2 3 4
Market Funding 5 6 7 8
Voluntary Funding 9 10 11 12
Informal Funding 13 14 15 16
end of free healthcare. He concludes that accusations of ‘privatisation’ and the
‘spectre of a US-style insurance system’ have become political grenades carelessly
and indiscriminately lobbed at anything that looks like change. The NHS’s history
is peppered by their deployment, and to be frank, they’ve been so overused over
the past few decades they’ve become rather meaningless.
At a very broad level, politicians tend to use the dictionary ‘minimalist’
definition of asset transfer in denying they are privatising the NHS, while critics
tend to use a ‘maximalist’ definition in regarding any move from public to
private as privatisation (see Powell and Miller, 2013) (despite the fact that the
NHS has contained some private elements since its inception). We now present
three different frames or lenses that may increase understanding on the contested
nature of privatisation.
Mixed economy of welfare perspectives
Narrow and broad definitions of privatisation can be seen in terms of the Mixed
Economy of Welfare (MEW) literature. A one-dimensional analysis, focused on
ownership, assumes that this is the only aspect that matters. A two-dimensional
analysis focuses on ownership and finance. A 2×2 ownership/finance matrix
appears in Keen et al. (2001), Salter (2004) and Klein (2005). A three-dimensional
MEW examines provision, finance and regulation (cf. Le Grand and Robinson,
1984; Ascoli and Ranci, 2002). This broadly fits with studies of health care systems
that focus on the dimensions of provision, finance and regulation (e.g., Scott,
2001; Wendt, 2009; but see Maarse, 2006).
The three-dimensional model (Powell, 2008: 18–19) differentiates between
provision and finance across state, market, and voluntary and informal sectors.
The third dimension, of state regulation, is indicated by inclusion of an H (high)
and L (low) regulation. It can be used to explore movement between origin
and destination cells to point to different types of privatisation (Table 1). For
example, ‘full’ privatisation would entail movement across all three dimensions
from Cell 1H (i.e., state funding and provision) with high regulation (through
hierarchical power as there would only be public sector provision) to that of
Cell 6L (i.e., market funding and provision) with low regulation. However,
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privatisation can involve any shift from the first (state) column, from the first
(state) row, or towards less regulation (H to L). In principle, it can differentiate
‘privatisation’ (e.g., to private for-profit provision, cell 2), ‘voluntarisation’ (e.g.,
to voluntary, third sector or non-profit provision, cell 3) and ‘informalisation’
(e.g., to informal provision, cell 4). This is important if it is considered that
for-profit provision is different to voluntary provision. For example, Mohan
(2009) differentiates ‘two visions of privatisation’ of markets and a ‘much more
benign version’ or ‘progressive privatisation’ of mutual, social enterprises and
cooperatives. However, the House of Commons Public Administration Select
Committee (2008: 104) were unable to corroborate ‘the central claim made by
the government, and by advocates of a greater role for the sector in service
delivery’ that ‘third sector organisations can deliver services in distinctive ways
which will improve outcomes for service users’. Moreover, it can be specific
regarding ‘contracting out’ to a for-profit provider as ‘de-provided privatisation’,
but precision may come at the cost of ugly terms.
The MEW literature has been little used to explore the privatisation debate,
and tends to focus on social care rather than health care (e.g., Daly and Lewis,
2000; Ascoli and Ranci, 2002; Evers and Svetlik, 1993). It is not clear if the informal
dimension is applicable to health care, although it is a major feature of ‘caring’
within social care, particularly caring for children and for (elderly) adults (e.g.,
Harris, 2002; Daly and Lewis, 2000). Moreover, public and private have other
meanings in the sense of men’s paid work in the public domain and women’s
unpaid work (including caring) in the private sphere (e.g., Harris, 2002). For
example, Daly and Lewis (2000) focus on the way in which social care lies at
the intersection of public and private (in the sense of both state/family and
state/market provision).
The major disadvantage is that while the MEW provides a clear heuristic
picture, it is difficult to provide clear measures as there is no obvious common
metric. Privatisation can be seen as less state provision, finance or regulation,
but while it is possible to measure provision or finance, regulation is more
problematic (see below).
‘Wheels of Welfare’ (WoW) perspectives
A different three-dimensional view was set out by Burchardt (1997), and
developed in subsequent publications (e.g., Smithies, 2005; Edmiston, 2011;
Burchardt, 2013). She develops a typology of welfare services based on ‘wheels
of welfare’ and attempts to illustrate its use by clarifying discussions about the
privatisation of welfare and by analysing changes in expenditure. It identifies
three dimensions of ‘private welfare’ – provision, finance and decision – each of
which may operate independently of the others. The degree of decision-making
power which consumers have is determined firstly by how directly they choose
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Figure 1. Wheels of welfare
the service, and, secondly on the extent to which there are viable alternatives.
Burchardt (2013) explains ‘decision’ as an element of ‘purchase’ which has two
components: the funding of the service and the decision about which provider
or how much of the service to buy. Burchardt (1997, 2013) refers to the third
dimension as ‘decision’, but Edmiston (2011) terms it control, which appears to
bring the typology closer to publicness terminology. Burchardt (1997) discusses,
but ultimately rejects, the dimension of regulation as it is not clear that regulation
constitutes a dimension which is independent of provision and finance as all
welfare providers are subject to regulation to a greater or lesser extent. She
differentiates the ‘pure public’ category (i.e., tax-financed, publicly provided
services under public decision-making) from the ‘other end of the spectrum’
of the ‘pure private’ (free-market) category, but also points to ‘contracting out’
(private provision, public finance and decision) and ‘voucher-type schemes’
(public finance, private decision and either public or private provision). A service
can be ‘privatised; through “decision”: handed to the consumer, whilst the state
retains responsibility for finance and possibly also for provision’ (p. 3).
Burchardt (2013) revisits the framework, discussing regulation as a candidate
for a fourth dimension. She concludes that rather than adding a new dimension
to the framework altogether, it would be interesting to look at the degree of
regulation to which the privately provided, privately decided subsector is subject
and how this has changed over time (pp. 10–11).
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Burchardt (1997) uses the typology to analyse changes in expenditure
on welfare by comparing spending in five main areas – education, health,
housing, social security and personal social services – in 1979/80 and 1995/96.
She notes the different mechanisms which are used to deliver welfare, with her
‘wheels of welfare’ differentiating between ‘outright privatisation’, contracting
out, marketing public services, user charges and vouchers. Across all services,
it is broadly agreed that shifts in the composition of welfare activity have been
relatively small and gradual. (Burchardt, 1997; Smithies, 2005; Edmiston, 2011).
Burchardt (2013) sums up that overall the picture is one of considerably greater
stability than one might have expected given the rate of reforms in public services
and plethora of initiatives in welfare under successive administrations.
In terms of health care, the figures for ‘pure public’ moved from 71 per cent
in 1979/80 to 64 per cent by 2007/8, while the ‘pure private’ category increased
from 9 per cent to 13 per cent. According to Edmiston (2011), the most notable
changes are the increasing role of the pure private and public decision: contracted
out categories of welfare activity. The rise in pure private activity is primarily
due to the increase in consumer spending on over-the-counter medicines and
private medical, dental, optical and nursing fees. The rise in ‘Public decision:
contracted out’ is due to an increase in the number and scale of private finance
initiatives, and the level of hospital care that is contracted out. Having said
that, the proportionate change in these two categories still appears slight and
gradual.
This approach appears to suggest two ways to examine change. First, a
crude measure might examine whether change occurs in one, two or three
dimensions. However, it is not clear if ‘third order change’ is inevitably more
significant than ‘first order change’. Second, change can be measured in terms
of expenditure. However, it is important to note critiques of expenditure as a
‘dependent variable’ (e.g., Esping-Andersen, 1990: 19–21). Edmiston (2011) notes
that expenditure does not necessarily always capture the extent of activity within
a given domain. For example, the extent of purely private welfare activity within
personal social services does not capture the extent of unpaid care and support
provided through informal kinship and support networks (cf. Powell, 2008:
29).
Publicness perspectives
Publicness is largely absent from social policy literature. For example, Newman
and Clarke (2009: 4) explore ‘public services as mediums of publicness’ without
referring to the ‘publicness’ literature. There are ‘many faces of publicness’
(Pesch, 2005: 108), but it is often divided into core and dimensional approaches
(e.g., Anderson, 2012; Andrews et al., 2011). The traditional core definition
is similar to a one-dimensional MEW focus on ownership (Pesch, 2005).
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Figure 2. Dimensional model of publicness
A two-dimensional account focuses on economic and political authority (e.g.,
Pesch, 2005: 112). Bozeman (1987: 17) and argues that political control is the
essence of publicness: ‘all organizations are public because political authority
affects some of the behavior and processes of all organizations’. This has now
developed into a ‘dimensional’ model of publicness that combines ownership
(public, private or non-profit), funding, (government grants versus consumer
payments) and control (by political or market forces). The model is dimensional
in the sense that all three variables should be viewed as continuous rather
than categorical. Thus, organisations can be more or less public on each of the
three dimensions. This raises the question of which aspect of publicness is most
important for organisational performance, and whether each one has separate
or interactive effects (Andrews et al., 2011). Anderson (2012) has produced a two-
dimensional grid for healthcare organisations. He argues that a distinction can
be made between hospitals with Foundation Trust (FT) status, having increased
economic authority but reduced political authority, and those under direct NHS
control, and subject to high levels of both economic and political authority.
This suggests some decline in publicness as FTs are less public than non-FT
hospitals.
According to Andrews et al. (2011) the number of studies that directly
compare public and private effects on performance in the same industry and
over the same time period is not great. Furthermore, most studies focus only on
ownership while neglecting the funding and control dimensions of publicness,
and examine effects on efficiency and effectiveness without paying much attention
to equity. They conclude that the existing evidence suggests that publicness
makes little difference to performance. However, such results should be treated
cautiously as the consequence of substantive and methodological problems is
that it is impossible to conclude with any confidence that publicness makes a
positive or negative difference to organisational performance or to judge which
of the three dimensions of publicness is most important and for which aspects
of organisational performance.
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Privatisation and the NHS
It is clear that the NHS has never been solely ‘purely public’ (e.g., GPs as
independent contractors; ‘pay beds’ within NHS hospitals; ‘out of pocket’
expenses or charges for prescriptions, and ‘high street’ pharmacy, dental and
optical care [Salter, 1998; Keen et al., 2001]). However, most commentators date
privatisation from the Conservative (1979–1997) government (e.g., Pollock, 2005).
Subsequent discussion focuses on this period onwards (although later periods
focus on the English NHS after political devolution: see e.g., Lister, 2008: chapter
8). For reasons of space, the focus is on health care rather than ‘continuing
care’ at the health/ social care boundary which has been termed ‘the biggest area
of privatisation’ (Lister, 2008: 66; but see Timmins, 2001; Klein, 2013), In this
chronological section, we examine privatisation in terms of the original debates
(i.e., with explanations – or no explanations – from the original authors). It is
noticeable that few authors give a clear or explicit definition of privatisation or
draw on the extant privatisation frameworks (above). We then apply our three
perspectives in the ‘Discussion’ section.
Conservative (1979–1997)
Ranade and Haywood (1989: 26–27) argue that most examples in this period
fall within Young’s (1986) categories of c (contracting) and f (extending private
sector practice into the public sector). Lister (2008: 56–59) writes of the ‘initial
flurry of privatisations in 1984’ associated with contracting out of ancillary
services (compulsory competitive tendering). Ranade and Haywood (1989) claim
that the distinctive contribution of the Conservative government lay in the efforts
to recast management structures, systems, norms and values in line with the
perceived virtues of the private sector. They concluded that a form of privatisation
was introduced by defining a new private sector general management model for
NHS managers to follow which increased upward accountability. According to
Klein (2013: 129), the government’s enthusiasm for privatisation turns out to be
heavily qualified in the case of ‘privatising’ health care costs by charging patients,
which has been termed ‘backdoor privatisation’ (e.g., Birch, 1986).
According to Salter (1998: 206–207), it was the Private Finance Initiative
(PFI) (also known as ‘Profits From Illness’, Lister, 2008: 124; and ‘Pure Financial
Incompetence’, Davis and Tallis, 2013: 32) which represented the most significant
sea-change. Under PFI a private firm builds and operates a facility, which is leased
back to the NHS for a period of some twenty-five to thirty-five years (Shaw, 2007:
chapter 5; Lister, 2013: chapter 7). Although the public sector does not ‘own’ the
asset for the contract period, it typically returns to the public sector at the end
of the contract (Shaw, 2007: 82). Salter (1998: 201–205) argues that while PFI
made little progress under the Conservatives in the NHS, it ‘has the potential to
rearrange the private–public mix in health care into a qualitatively new form and
balance.’
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New Labour (1997–2010)
For Pollock (2005) privatisation was the common theme that underpinned
the New Labour reforms. Similarly, Lister (2008: chapter 9) explores ‘new
dimensions in privatisation’, particularly the contracting out of clinical services
which increased tenfold the NHS spend on private sector health care. He writes
that by about 2006 privatisation was ‘galloping not creeping privatisation’, and
‘floodgates of privatisation’ had opened (p. 185).
Lister (2008: chapter 9) charts Labour’s changing views on PFI from being
‘totally unacceptable’ and ‘the thin edge of the wedge of privatisation’ in 1995
and ‘privatisation by another name’ in 1996 (Craig with Brooks, 2006: 135) to
acceptance later in 1996, and forming in government the basis for ‘the biggest
hospital building programme in the history of the NHS’. However, critics within
the Labour Party regarded it as creeping privatisation, while the Guardian likened
it to ‘paying for a mortgage through Barclaycard’ (Shaw, 2007: chapter 4).
Lister (2013: 193) argues that while PFI maintains the appearance of a publicly
funded, publicly provided service, an increasing share of NHS property assets
has been privatised. Maarse (2006) regards PFI as a notable step to privatisation
in investments. However, Mathieson (2012) argues that PFI involves building
new publicly owned NHS hospitals, not private ones, presumably due to the
time-limited lease.
The Labour 1997 Manifesto made it clear that it was opposed to the use of
the private sector in the supply of clinical services (Shaw, 2007: 108–110). Initially
Labour was hostile to the use of the private sector, with Health Minister Alan
Milburn telling a group of NHS managers that he would come down ‘like a ton
of bricks’ on managers who used it (in Timmins, 2001: 598). However, in 1998
Milburn replaced Frank Dobson as Secretary of State for Health, and is said to
have written the NHS Plan (DH, 2000) over one weekend. The only significant
reference to the private sector in the NHS Plan was the ‘concordat’ between the
NHS and the private sector (Leys and Player, 2011: 107–108). However, the plan saw
Labour ‘cross the Rubicon’ in its relations with the private sector (Timmins, 2001:
598).
Increasingly, choice and diversity became the watchwords (Mays et al.,
2011). The cornerstone principles were collective funding and equal access
free at the point of delivery: as Milburn put it, whether treatment takes
place in a private sector hospital or an NHS hospital is ‘frankly, a secondary
consideration’ (Shaw, 2007: 119). This fits with the view of the Commission on
Private Public Partnerships (2001) which discusses means and ends, arguing
that the case for public services needs to be made in terms of values and
outcomes rather than particular forms of delivery. The founding principles
of the NHS were that it should be free, universal and comprehensive, not
that it should be provided through a particular structure, process or set of
employees.
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Foundation Trusts (FTs) were given greater autonomy. They were said to be a
‘new model of public ownership’ of ‘public benefit corporations’, firmly rooted in
the cooperative and mutual tradition and ‘wholly part of the NHS’ (Shaw, 2007:
104–106). According to Milburn, in no way could FT be reasonably described as
privatisation, or a step in that direction (Leys and Player, 2011: 22–23). According
to Klein (2005: 59), FT are within the public sector, and are a ‘long way from
privatisation’. However, critics argued that they resembled private businesses
(e.g., Pollock, 2005: 75–78, 130)
Critics focus on the ‘forced’ privatisation associated with Independent Sector
Treatment Centres (ISTC) in that the commissioners (Primary Care Trusts, PCTs)
were ‘persuaded’ by government to set them up, with this ‘preferential treatment’
resulting in a ‘unlevel playing field’ associated with cream skimming and market
rigging (Pollock, 2005: 242–247; Shaw, 2007: chapter 5; Lister, 2008: chapter 9).
Similarly, the ‘Choose and Book’ Initiative means that the ‘choice menu’ has to
include a private sector provider (Pollock, 2005: 241–242). Lister (2013: chapter
7) regards the ‘watershed’ as when the NHS was excluded from competing for
contracts (p. 180). ‘Our Health, Our Say’ (DH, 2006) forced PCTs to put their
provider services, which included most community health services, out to tender
(Leys and Player, 2011: 108). According to Lister (2008: 188), the document was
a significant new element driving PCTs towards further and faster privatisation
associated with third sector and social enterprise provision. ‘Any Willing Provider’
opened up services to tender (Lister, 2013: 179). The ‘Transforming Community
Services’ programme required PCTs to divest themselves of all direct provision
by April 2010. As part of this programme, the Department of Health (DH)
introduced the Right to Request (RtR) scheme which enabled and supported
healthcare staff to spin their community services out of the NHS and into social
enterprises (Miller et al., 2012). All PCTs were instructed to set up at least one
‘polyclinic’ (Darzi Centre), with about a third run by private companies (Leys
and Player, 2011: 46–47). The ‘NHS Improvement Plan’ (DH, 2004) was ‘relatively
forthright about privatisation’ stating that by 2008 independent providers would
carry out up to 15 per cent of scheduled procedures (Leys and Player, 2011: 107–
108).
Some critics regard Personal Health Budgets (PHB) as privatisation (e.g.,
Leys and Player, 2011: 64–66). On the other hand, it has been seen as giving
people much more control over how their needs are met, what services they
receive and who delivers them (Alekeson and Rumbold, 2013). They argue that
the risks of individual choice are minimised as all care plans must be clinically
and financially sound in order to be signed off by commissioners.
There were concerns over ‘franchising out NHS Trust management’. The
‘most notorious failure’ was at Good Hope Hospital Trust in Birmingham which
was handed over on a three year contract to Secta that was terminated after eight
months. The FT regulator, Monitor, was ‘largely privatised’ with two-thirds of
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its first year budget spent on management consultants. By 2006, the NHS was
spending more on consultancy than the whole of UK manufacturing industry
(Lister, 2008: 236–239). The management of the Hinchingbrooke hospital was
taken over by ‘Circle’ (Leys and Player, 2011: 49–50). This privatisation saw a
hospital run by a company registered in the Virgin Islands (Davis and Tallis, 2013:
195–196). However, Mathieson (2012) argues that Hinchingbrooke represents
‘management outsourcing’ or ‘operating franchise’ rather than privatisation as it
is time-limited.
While critics (e.g., Pollock, 2005; Leys and Player, 2011; Lister, 2008, 2013)
see significant privatisation, other commentators (e.g., Ham, 2012; Klein, 2013)
see the New Labour reforms not as privatisation per se but rather on the basis
of developing a market in which patients choose providers from any sector, and
point to the limited degree of provision by private providers.
Conservative/Liberal-Democrat Coalition (2010–)
There are many aspects of the coalition’s reforms that can be seen as a
continuation and extension of the New Labour period (Leys and Player, 2011;
Millar et al., 2011; Timmins, 2012; Davis and Tallis, 2013). The Health and Social
Care Bill contained many controversial measures (see Davis and Tallis, 2013; Klein,
2013; Timmins, 2012), but Mathieson (2012) claims that it was ‘not privatisation’.
For Ham (2012) the ‘greatest threat is inertia rather than privatisation’. The
government claims ‘no privatisation’ on narrow criteria (NHS services will
remain publicly funded and free at the point of delivery), with its definition
of ‘privatisation’ given by Health Minister, Anne Milton, who stated that the
government is not pursuing a policy of privatisation of health care providers
whereby national health service organisations would be transferred from public
to private ownership and control (NHS Privatisation 20 October 2011, HC Deb,
c1081W).
At the Labour Party Conference in 2012, Shadow Secretary of State for
Health Andy Burnham claimed that recently signed contracts for almost 400
NHS services, worth a quarter of a billion pounds, resulted in the ‘biggest ever
act of privatisation ever seen in the NHS’ (Ramesh, 2012). The Coalition ‘cranked
up the pace’ of ‘Any Willing Provider’ which was renamed as ‘Any Qualified
Provider’, extending to a wider range of community and mental health services
(Lister, 2013: 179). All NHS Trusts are required to try to move to FT status leading
to the claim that the NHS would become ‘the largest and most vibrant social
enterprise sector in the world’ (DH, 2010: 36; see Miller et al., 2012). Lister (2012)
writes that this plan for all NHS trusts to become autonomous FTs leads to a
longer-term goal of getting FT ‘off the NHS balance sheet’, floating them off as
non-profit ‘social enterprises’. He continues that ‘this experimental policy would,
if carried through, effectively privatise virtually all the provision of health services
in England by 2014 (p. 146).
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Lister (2012) points to the raising of the cap on the amount of income
NHS FTs are allowed to make from private medicine, which may lead them to
prioritise generating income from their new, private, paying customers, leaving
a two-tier system in which NHS patients are less attractive prospects – reduced
to second-class citizens even in NHS hospitals.
Klein (2013: 318) states that England has so far been immune to the ‘passive
privatisation’ involved in making consumers pay more of the costs of health
care, with out-of-pocket payments representing a low and falling proportion of
total health care expenditure. However, Lister (2012) points out that PCTs drew
up lists of treatments that would no longer be available on the NHS, which
he considers will expand as Clinical Commissioning Groups (the successors
to PCTs) experience greater financial austerity. This effectively confronts local
patients who can afford to do so with the stark choice of seeking private treatment
or going without. It has been claimed that there are major potential conflicts of
interest in placing GPs in charge of spending decisions, as over a third of those
on the boards of the new Clinical Commissioning Groups had financial interests
in private health care providers, meaning that ‘things are looking good for Dr
Fat Cat’ (Davis and Tallis, 2013: 6). Lister (2013: 155) expresses concerns that
‘Personal Health Budgets’ or the possible introduction of ‘person based resource
accounting’ may leave individuals to ‘top up’ from their own pockets or from
health insurance. According to Shadow Health Secretary, Andy Burnham, there
has been a significant increase in hospitals generating income from ‘self-funding’
procedures, through a ‘premier service’, that were no longer available free at the
point of delivery on the NHS (McTague, 2013). At the Labour Party Conference
in 2013, Burnham stated that the Coalition’s health policies placed the NHS on
a ‘fast-track’ to privatisation, and promised that a future Labour government
would repeal the legislation (McTague, 2013).
Discussion
The chronological sections show that there are different views regarding
privatisation in the NHS, which are often based on implicit or unclear definitions
of the term. Table 2 provides a summary of their perspectives on the major policy
initiatives outlined above. There are some similarities within these largely ‘silo’
based literatures. All agree on a ‘wide’ or dimensional definition of privatisation,
that the internal market constituted marketisation rather than privatisation, and
that private sector management methods do not appear to fit any dimension. They
also agree that increased charges, contracting out/ CCT (for non-clinical services),
the Right to Request and the Concordat (for clinical services), and allowing FTs
to raise more private income, constitute different types of privatisation. Higher
charges are a form of ‘commodification’ that privatise finance. Contracting out
privatises provision to either the for-profit or non-for-profit sectors.
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TABLE 2. A comparison of privatisation perspectives
Policy MEW WoW Publicness
Private sector management methods in NHS No (MEW 1) No No (PU1,PU3,PU5)
Private sector managing NHS hospitals Yes? (MEW 2) Yes (provision)? Yes? (PR2, PU3,PU5)
Quasi-markets No (MEW 1) No No (PU1,PU3,PU5)
Contracting Out Yes (MEW 2 & 3) Yes (provision) Yes (PR2,PU3,PU5)
Concordat with independent sector Yes (MEW 2 & 3) Yes (provision) Yes (PR2,PU3,PU5)
Foundation Trusts Yes? (MEW 1, 2 & 3; lower regulation?) Yes? (provision) Yes? (PR2?,PU3,PR6?)
Right to Request Social Enterprise Yes (MEW3) Yes (provision) Yes (PR2,PU3,PU5)
Individual Choice (eg Choose and Book) Yes? (MEW 1, 2, & 3) Yes (decision) Yes? (PR2,PU3,PU5)
Personal Health Budgets Yes? (MEW 1, 2, 3 & 4) Yes (decision) Yes (PR2,PR4?,PU5)
Charges/ co-payments/ ‘self-funding’ Yes (MEW14) Yes (finance) Yes (PU1,PR4,PU5)
Private Finance Initiative ? Concerned with revenue expenditure? ?
Raising cap on FT private income Yes? (MEW 3 & 14); less regultion Yes (decision) Yes? (PR2,PR4,PR6)
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Whilst the frameworks can be argued to provide a degree of clarity, it is a
matter of interpretation whether some policies are seen as privatisation. FT can
be argued to remain within the state, or be seen as private or ‘social enterprise’
provision. Moreover, it can be argued that FTs are subject to less regulation
(more autonomy from the Secretary of State) or more regulation (from the
‘quality industry’). Similarly, it can be argued that PFI and private management
of hospitals (e.g., Hinchingbrooke) can be regarded as privatisation, but also
representing a time-limited (albeit long term) out-sourcing or leasing rather
than a permanent transfer of assets. Raising the cap on FT income is more
problematic, but may reduce regulation, and may lead to a greater focus on
‘paying customers’ rather than NHS patients.
The main conceptual difference is that MEW and publicness stress regulation
while WoW stresses decision. Burchardt (2013) notes that we need a common
metric across services in order to analyse welfare activity overall. For her, this
metric is spending, but this neglects regulation. While the transfer of assets can
be measured in financial terms at one point in time (e.g., the value of privatised
utilities or housing: cf. wealth) and state finance can be measured in financial
terms in annual contract value (income), it is difficult to see how regulation can
be measured in a common currency. From a MEW perspective, Johnson (1989)
discusses regulation associated with standards, quantity and cost. Publicness
perspectives examine forms of political control in the public sector, including
audit, inspection, performance reports, the submission of plans and limits on
budgetary autonomy. On the one hand, it can be argued that regulation has
decreased as the aim of creating FT was to give them more autonomy from
the Secretary of State (e.g., Klein, 2013; Mays et al., 2011; Shaw, 2007). On the
other hand, it is possible to argue that there has been increased regulation (e.g.,
National Institute for Health and Clinical Care Excellence, Monitor, Care Quality
Commission) which should prevent any negative impact of privatisation. In
terms of input, New Labour saw more regulators and more regulation, but
measuring regulation in terms of outcome or success is more difficult, with some
commentators pointing to regulatory failure (e.g., Mays et al., 2011). The scandal at
the Mid Staffordshire NHS FT was not prevented by the ‘quality industry’ (Klein,
2013: 295–298). As Klein (2013: 296) puts it, why were 290 recommendations (of
the Francis Report on the Mid Staffordshire FT) for change needed to make the
NHS safe when successive governments had made the pursuit of ‘quality’ one of
their main policy goals for the previous two decades?
The decision dimension of WoW may be linked with the ‘privatisation of
risk without privatisation of the welfare state’ (Hacker, 2004) that differentiates
between the degree to which potent threats to income are spread across citizens
of varied circumstances (risk socialisation) or left to individuals or families to
cope with at their own (risk privatisation). The boundaries of collective risk pools
can be changed in three ways: explicit alterations of rules governing eligibility or
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benefits; changes in those rules’ implementation; and shifts in the constellation of
risks itself. Hacker gives the example of moves from ‘defined-benefit’ to ‘defined-
contribution’ plans in pensions, which increases risk. Similarly, there may be
risks associated with ‘poor choices’ in PHB. It follows that WoW would consider
increased choice (e.g., Choose and Book) and PHB as privatisation as they
privatise decision, but the other approaches would consider these as privatisation
only if the result of that choice leads to an increase in private provision. However,
it is arguable that a ‘loaded dice’ (a menu that necessarily includes a private
provider) will lead to an increased probability of privatisation.
Conclusions
Definitions and operationalisations of ‘privatisation’ are often implicit, unclear
and conflicting, resulting in conflicting accounts of the occurrence, chronology
and degree of privatisation in the NHS. This paper has explored three approaches
to privatisation: MEW, WOW and publicness. It has suggested that while all
three approaches agree that some policies constitute privatisation, there is some
disagreement largely stemming from the differential stress on regulation or
decision. It is important to introduce greater transparency into claims that allow
the terms of engagement for a debate, and these frameworks do provide some
necessary rationale about the criteria on which policies are said to privatise the
NHS. However, all approaches require further development on two key issues:
measurement of the degree of privatisation, and the important but neglected
point of how different types of privatisation (above) lead to different impacts
on patients. First, the degree of privatisation has been disputed, although clear
concepts and measures are often not stated (cf. e.g., Ham, 2012; Klein, 2013
with Leys and Player, 2011; Lister, 2012, 2013). Second, under what assumptions
and conditions do changes on criteria such as provision, finance, regulation
or decision lead to effects on different groups of patients? Anderson’s (2012:
321) conclusions on publicness are equally applicable to other approaches: in
healthcare organisations a wide range of questions remain unanswered. Is giving
organisations greater economic authority more important than giving them
greater political authority for improving their performance? What elements of
political or economic authority contribute most to better or worse performance ?
In short, we need to answer the question of Edwards and Lewis (2008): who owns
and operates healthcare providers, and does it matter? The three frameworks
considered here provide a foothold in this mountainous debate, but there is still a
considerable and treacherous climb ahead before we can come out of the clouds
and get a clear and panoramic perspective.
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